On Liking Aesthetic Value by Gorodeisky, Keren
 1 
ON LIKING AESTHETIC VALUE 
Keren Gorodeisky 
Auburn University 
[forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; please cite the published 
version once available] 
 
 
ABSTRACT: According to tradition, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to a 
certain feeling of liking or pleasure. Is that true? Two answers are on offer in the field of 
aesthetics today: 1. The Hedonist answers: Yes, aesthetic value is non-contingently 
connected to pleasure insofar as this value is constituted and explained by the power of 
its possessors to please (under standard conditions). 2. The Non-Affectivist answers: No. 
At best, pleasure is contingently related to aesthetic value. The aim of this paper is to 
point to a blind spot in the dialectic between these two standard positions by defending a 
third neglected answer to the question above, the answer of the Value-Meriting-Pleasure 
[VMP] advocate. According to this answer, a certain kind of (cognitive and responsive) 
pleasure is connected to aesthetic value non-contingently, but also non-hedonically. VMP 
is the view that objects of aesthetic value are non-contingently related to pleasure insofar 
as they merit a certain kind of pleasure. But, pace the hedonist, those objects are valuable 
(those that are to be engaged with etc.) neither on account of their capacity to give 
pleasure nor on account of the hedonic value of the attitude they merit. 
 
 
We often describe our responses to films, novels, songs, landscapes and other aesthetically 
valuable objects in affective terms: we “hate” or “love” them, “admire,” “enjoy” or “detest” 
them, or find that they “leave us cold.” Most often, we communicate our aesthetic responses in 
terms of our likes and dislikes. Tradition has a succinct explanation of this way of speaking: 
aesthetic value is essentially connected to feeling, particularly to a certain kind of liking or 
pleasure. Is that true? Should we endorse a non-contingent connection between aesthetic value 
and a feeling of liking or pleasure? Call this The Affective Question.  
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Two answers are on offer in the field of aesthetics today:  
 
1. The Hedonist answers: Yes, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to pleasure 
insofar as this value is constituted and explained by the power of its possessors to give 
pleasure (under standard conditions). What makes objects aesthetically valuable is their 
capacity to produce pleasure. 
 
[T]he aesthetic merit of a work of art derives from (1) the aesthetic pleasure that (2) it is capable of giving 
to a consumer . . . (Mohan Matthen, 2018: 28) 
 
The aesthetic value of an object is the value it possesses in virtue of its capacity to provide aesthetic 
gratification. (Beardsley, 1982: 21)1  
 
2. The Non-Affectivist answers: No. At best, pleasure is contingently related to aesthetic 
value insofar as some of its possessors may happen to cause pleasure in certain subjects.  
 
[Pleasure is] a contingent byproduct of aesthetic engagement. (Lopes, ms.: 3) 
 
[T]he connection between appreciation and liking . . . is a contingent matter, specifically a matter of 
individual psychology. (Carroll, 2016: 6)  
 
 
The aim of this paper is to point to a blind spot in the dialectic between these two 
standard positions. Instead of these two answers to the affective question, I propose a third 
neglected answer: 
 
The Value-Meriting-Pleasure [henceforth VMP] advocate answers: Yes, an affective 
experience of liking, which, for reasons I explain below, I also call pleasure, is connected to 
aesthetic value non-contingently, but also non-hedonically (not in the way the hedonist conceives 
 
1 Cf., Levinson (1996), Matthen (2014), (2017). 
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of this connection). On this picture, objects of aesthetic value are non-contingently related to 
pleasure insofar as they merit a certain kind of pleasure. But, pace the hedonist, those objects are 
valuable (those that are to be engaged with etc.) neither on account of their capacity to give 
pleasure nor on account of the hedonic value of the experience they merit.  
This already suggests the direction of the non-contingent relation advocated by VMP, 
which is the same direction endorsed by Socrates against Euthyphro: according to the VMPer, 
Euthyphro is as confused about aesthetic value as he is about piety. Excellent artworks, graceful 
movements, majestic castles and many more objects that we correctly marvel at for their 
aesthetic qualities are not aesthetically valuable because they give pleasure. Rather, they merit 
our pleasure insofar as they are aesthetically valuable.2 By virtue of being aesthetically valuable 
objects, they merit, deserve or call for a positive affective experience: a feeling of pleasure or 
liking.3  
 
2 This is an entailment claim not an explanatory value-claim: on VMP, O is aesthetically 
valuable iff O merits a certain kind of pleasure, but O is not valuable because O merits pleasure.  
3 Let me be clear: VMP is not the view that the experience of aesthetic value entails pleasure (in 
some statistically significant group). It is completely possible not to feel pleasure in aesthetically 
valuable objects (even in cases where we correctly ascribe this value to them). VMP holds 
instead that the very possession of aesthetic value by an object entails the merit of pleasure. This 
commitment groups VMP among so-called Neo-Sentimentalist Theories of Value (or Neo-
Sentimentalist Fitting-Attitude Analyses of Value), namely, among those theories that elucidate 
certain values or evaluative concepts in terms of the affective attitude that they merit. See for 
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VMP occupies a neglected space in the dialectic between hedonism and non-affectivism 
insofar as it retains both the grain of truth in hedonism, namely, the hedonist’s commitment to a 
non-contingent relation between aesthetic value and a feeling of pleasure, and the grain of truth 
in its non-affective denial, namely, the denial that what makes aesthetically valuable objects 
valuable is their power to please. Unlike the non-affectivist, the VMP advocate answers the 
question “what marks aesthetically valuable things as aesthetically valuable?” by appeal to 
pleasure. But unlike the hedonist, she rejects an answer to the question, “what makes aesthetic 
valuable things valuable?” that appeals to pleasure. On VMP, aesthetically valuable objects are 
neither valuable on account of their tendency to cause pleasure (under suitable conditions), nor 
on account of the hedonic value of the pleasurable response they merit. Yet, that they are 
aesthetically (rather than, say, epistemically, pragmatically, financially or otherwise) valuable 
means that they merit aesthetic pleasure.  
 
The main task of the paper is not to argue conclusively for this neglected alternative, but 
to put it on the table as an attractive account of aesthetic value. In section 1, I introduce some 
preliminaries. In section 2, I present the view. In section 3, I present a few observations in favor 
of it, but none of these is meant as a conclusive argument for VMP. In the rest of the paper, I 
motivate VMP against (1) aesthetic hedonism (section 4), and (2) two varieties of non-
affectivism about aesthetic value: (a) the doxastic account that explains aesthetic value in terms 
 
example, McDowell (1984), Wiggins (1987), D’Arms and Jacobson (2000a)(2000b), and 
Tappolet (2016). On the categorization of VMP among these theories, see 1.1.  
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of belief (5.1), and (b) the practical account that explains aesthetic value in terms of action (5.2). 
I end the paper, in section 6, by gesturing towards my favored direction for answering the 
normative question about the ground of aesthetic value.  
 
1. Some Preliminaries 
1.1  VMP and Fitting Attitude Analyses 
Before moving any further, I wish to clarify the core commitment of VMP by situating the view, 
not only within aesthetics, but also within the wider literature on value given its noticeable 
affinities with a certain tradition in meta-ethics. The normative term “merit” that I introduced 
above in order to characterize the relation between aesthetic value and pleasure is closely related 
to the normative terms “fittingness” and “appropriateness” that are at the center of a vibrant 
normative tradition starting, arguably, with Frantz Brentano (1969). The core commitment of this 
tradition is to the characterization of values in terms of the affective experiences that they do not 
just elicit or tend to elicit, but those that they merit or render appropriate. The VMP advocate 
agrees with this heart of the tradition when applied to aesthetic value. She uses the terms “merit,” 
“fittingness,” and “appropriateness” similarly to the way in which they are (minimally) used by 
advocates of this tradition to claim that the particular kind of value at stake in this paper—
aesthetic value—is best characterized in terms of the affective experience that is appropriate to it. 
For her, the facts that bear on whether an object is aesthetically valuable render a certain kind of 
(cognitive) affective experience, which I call “aesthetic pleasure” and define below, “fitting” or 
“appropriate.” VMP, then, is a Neo-Sentimentalist kind of “Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value” 
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[FAA],4 insofar as it elucidates a certain kind of value in terms of the affective/sentimental 
attitude that is appropriate to it,5 where this “particular species of the appropriateness of response 
[is the one] relevant to property ascription—to whether some X is F” (D’Arms and Jacobson, 
2000(a):731). 
 
4 E.g., Brentano (1969),  Scheller (1973), McDowell (1984), Wiggins (1987), D’Arms and 
Jacobson (2000a)(2000b), and Tappolet (2016). VMP may nonetheless differ from (at least most 
extant) FAA in (1) its (narrow) ambition to explain only one kind of value in terms of its fitting 
attitude, and in (2) its primitivist proposal about the source of aesthetic value, as that which is 
valuable independently of its effects on human beings (see section 6). If FAA are defined by the 
claim that sentimentally valuable objects are valuable on account of the value of their 
sentimental effects on human beings, then VMP is not a FAA.  
5 The way I use the term ‘attitude’ in this paper to refer to aesthetic pleasure as the attitude that 
aesthetic value merits is in line with the way that this same term is used in the normative 
literature to refer to “fitting attitudes,” and, more generally, to emotional experiences of value. 
This way of using the term is slightly different from the way it is used in the literature on 
perception to denote one element of an experience, the one that is distinguished both from the 
‘content’ of the experience, and from the experience as a whole.  Since I do not mean to 
distinguish between the ‘attitude’ and the affective experience that I call aesthetic pleasure in this 
latter way, I also use the term ‘attitude’ interchangeably with the terms ‘feeling’ and ‘affective 
experience.’ Moreover, referring to it as an ‘attitude’ is not meant to suggest that aesthetic 
pleasure is propositional. Rather, the term serves to stress that aesthetic pleasure is the fitting or 
appropriate stance towards, or experience of, aesthetic value. 
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However, as will become clear in the following, the VMP picture developed in this paper 
goes beyond this minimal claim that is shared by all FAA. It involves a particular development 
of this claim, one that advocates, for example, not only the normative independence of aesthetic 
value from its power to elicit pleasure (pace the aesthetic hedonist), but also the metaphysical 
independence of aesthetic value from the pleasure that it merits.6 These commitments do not 
undermine the affinities between VMP and FAA, but they highlight the particular way in which 
the proposed VMP develops the core fittingness claim shared by all FAA.7  
Since highlighting how VMP is both continuous with, and divergent from, the 
sentimental tradition of FAA may prove helpful and clarificatory, I will continue to situate the 
 
6 In this respect, VMP continues the path in the tradition of FAA that is advocated by such as 
Scheller (1973), arguably Wiggins (1987), Oddie (2005) (though with regard to the conative 
attitude of desire) and Tappolet (2016).  
7 In spite of these affinities between VMP and FAA, the view has to be put on the table (as I 
claimed above) for the following reasons: first, though a number of FAA theorists mention 
aesthetic value, they do nothing more than mention it. As far as I know, there is no developed 
FAA of aesthetic value other than the one I propose in this paper. Second, the FAA theorists that 
do mention aesthetic value do not mention aesthetic pleasure as its fitting attitude, let alone 
characterize this pleasure in the way I do. Finally, given that the particular meriting relation 
between aesthetic value and pleasure that I advocate in this paper is not seriously considered as a 
live option in contemporary discussions concerning this value and this pleasure, to introduce, 
develop and motivate VMP, as I do in this paper, is to “put it on the table” as an attractive 
account of aesthetic value.   
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proposal within this tradition wherever relevant in the rest of the paper. But given how thorny 
and technical the term “fitting attitude” has become,8 and given that I can say most everything I 
say about the relation between the value and the affective attitude at stake in this paper in 
different terms, I aim to minimize the “fittingness” talk.    
 
1.2 Aesthetic? 
Some concepts come with a weighty baggage. They are loaded, located at the center of heated 
debates. “Aesthetic value” is an honor member of this group, and so a few preparatory remarks 
are called for before we can get to any substance.  
Though the circle of its critics is growing each day,9 for many years now, the leading 
picture (indeed, the myth) of what the ‘aesthetic’ is has been, and still is, the following one: the 
‘aesthetic,’ on this picture, modifies properties, values and experiences that are merely sensory, 
those that are, or are perceived by, experiences and feelings which are much like headaches—
merely passive, non-cognitive, and not fully rational experiences. Aesthetic experiences are 
kinds “of sensuous thrill[s] that beauty . . . causes in us without benefit of argument or analysis” 
(Danto, 2003, p. 93). As Danto suggests in this passage, on this picture, ‘aesthetic’ experiences 
are not merely sensory, but also independent of, and opposed to, exercises of the intellect; they 
just sweep us, independently of understanding and analyzing their objects. But, since art does 
require understanding, background knowledge, familiarity with a genre and context, immersion 
in the artworld, and, according to the Dantoesque line, much “argument or analysis,” the 
‘aesthetic’ is standardly regarded as irrelevant to art. In fact, most art as we know it since the 
 
8 E.g., Howard (2018).  
9 E.g., Shelley (2003), (2010), Lopes (2018).  
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1960’s has nothing to do with anything aesthetic. Or so goes the anti-aesthetic move that 
typically goes with this picture of the ‘aesthetic.’ While this is not the place to argue against this 
picture, I will just note that I use the term ‘aesthetic’ differently, more broadly (though 
nonetheless in sync with the tradition of thinking about the ‘aesthetic’ from the 18th century):  
(1) When serving to modify experiences, the ‘aesthetic’ in this paper modifies a broader 
experiential category than that of the ‘merely sensory.’ Correspondingly, it refers to 
properties that may not be apprehended by any one of the five senses, but could 
nonetheless be apprehended by non-inferential (perceptual, imaginative and affective) 
experiences. These properties may include ‘daring,’ ‘witty’ and ‘shocking,’ the 
properties that Danto ascribed to Duchamp’s conceptual work, Fountain, just as much 
as they may include ‘profundity,’ ‘depth,’ ‘insight,’ and ‘illumination.’10 Even though 
the latter are not experienced by any of the five senses, they have been regarded as 
aesthetic properties of literary works ever since philosophers started to use the term 
‘aesthetic’ in the 18th century. This gives us reason to avoid restricting the ‘aesthetic’ 
to the merely sensory, and licenses us to speak of (at least some) conceptual artworks 
as aesthetic.  
(2) The ‘aesthetic’ in this paper is not opposed to reasoning, understanding, and other 
exercises of the intellect, but encompasses them. This use is also continuous with a 
very long tradition of emphasizing that aesthetic experience, perception and feeling 
necessarily involve the intellectual capacities of the understanding, reason and 
thought. As Hume put it, “the beauties or blemishes [of the work of a genius] cannot 
 
10 Shelley (2010) 
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be perceived by him, whose thought is not capacious enough” (Hume, 1985, XXIII; 
italics added).11 
(3) When it comes to artworks, I will use the term ‘aesthetic value,’ like some before me, 
to refer broadly to “the value of an object qua work of art” (Gaut, 1998: 183). Thus, 
artworks (and other objects) may be aesthetically valuable not only on account of the 
properties that have been typically regarded as ‘aesthetic value properties’ (e.g., 
‘beautiful,’ ‘graceful,’ ‘elegant,’ ‘garish’), but also on account of properties like 
‘daring,’ ‘shocking,’ ‘profundity,’ and ‘insightfulness,’ and even on account of their 
‘disturbing power’ and ‘boringness.’ 
(4) And I will also assume that fine art and natural objects are not the only objects of 
aesthetic value. Other artifacts and objects may be aesthetically valuable.12  
 
Time to turn to some substance.  
 
2. Value Meriting Pleasure 
In this section, I present the core commitments of VMP.  
 
 
11 Cf. Kant, who held that, aesthetic pleasure is “reflective” and “a priori” (2000, p. 221). For 
him, “a representation of truth, suitability, beauty or justice could never enter our thought if we 
could not elevate ourselves above the senses to higher cognitive faculties” (2000, p. 173; italics 
added). Cf. Shelley (2003). 
12 Cf. Lopes (2018: 7).  
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2.1 The relation between aesthetic value and pleasure 
What is the non-contingent relation between aesthetic value and the affective attitude I call 
aesthetic pleasure that VMP is committed to? 
First, pleasure is non-contingently connected to aesthetic value insofar as it is part of the 
concept ‘aesthetic value,’13 such that predicating this concept is ascribing a value property that 
merits aesthetic pleasure (whether one feels the pleasure or not).   
This non-contingent connection, then, is a meriting rather than a dispositional or a 
grounding relation. What is common to all aesthetically valuable objects—by their nature as 
aesthetically valuable—is that they merit, deserve or call for a specific kind pleasure (to be 
explained below) in much the same way that persons merit and call for respect, pitiful people 
merit or call for a feeling of pity and morally outrageous events merit or call for a feeling of 
moral outrage. Aesthetic value calls for and normatively supports a certain kind of pleasure just 
as these other values and disvalues call for and normatively support certain other affective 
experiences. To this extent, VMP is an FAA of aesthetic value.  
Notice that these axiological terms (of merit and desert) imply a distinction between 
feeling and endorsing: to judge an object to be aesthetically valuable is not necessarily to feel 
pleasure, but to endorse a certain kind of pleasure as merited, called for, or appropriate.   
For this reason, the relevant meriting relation is not to be identified with a dispositional 
relation. VMP is not the view that aesthetic value is to be experienced with pleasure under 
 
13 Even though I sometime speak in terms of the concept, the aim is not just to get clear on the 
concept, but on the nature of this peculiar kind of value and of the objects that are so valuable. 
What matters are those objects and their value.  
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standard conditions. It may or it may not. Often, we fail to be responsive to what this value 
merits and calls for, even if we correctly and justifiably believe that the object in question merits 
pleasure. The relevant failure is a failure of responsiveness analogous to the failure to respect a 
person as she merits: even if one judges that an object is valuable in the way that it is, one may 
fail to feel the pleasure that the object nonetheless merits, just as one may fail to respect a person 
even if one judges that the person merits respect. Therefore, the claim that we don’t always enjoy 
or like objects that we judge to be aesthetically great is no objection against VMP.14 I do not 
deny “that there is no contradiction, for example, in asserting that a certain work of art is good, 
but not to one’s liking” (Carroll, 2016: 6). VMP allows for different forms of non-affective 
responses to and evaluations of aesthetically valuable objects.15 Still, whether we feel this 
pleasure or not, aesthetic value merits the pleasure that I will define below. Unlike 
dispositionalism, on VMP, even in normal conditions, human beings may not feel this pleasure. 
But VMP shares with dispositionalism the claim that aesthetic value must be characterized in 
terms of a certain kind of experience. 
 
Next consider another, popular, non-contingent relation between aesthetic value and 
pleasure—the hedonic relation. The non-contingent relation between aesthetic value and pleasure 
that VMP advocates should not be identified with a value-grounding, hedonic relation. The 
hedonist claims that pleasure (or the capacity to please) is the ground of this value in the sense of 
 
14 And so VMP embraces what is often regarded as a “critical gap” between judgments and 
emotional responses (e.g., D’Arms and Jacobson 2006), which I prefer calling the critical gap 
between believing and feeling or between correctly attributing value and valuing.  
15 See my forthcoming. 
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being that which makes its possessors valuable. But the VMPer takes such an aesthetico-
Euthyphro to be confused. What makes, say, Sakai Hoitsu’s Autumn Plants and Quails beautiful 
and Lin-Manuel Miranda’s Hamilton brilliant is not their power to please or the value of the 
pleasantness of the experience that they tend to cause. Nevertheless, it is precisely their aesthetic 
excellence that makes these works worthy of pleasure. The VMPer rejects the hedonist’s claim 
that we should value certain things because of their power to please. On VMP, it is not the power 
to please that normatively supports our aesthetically valuing objects, but their being aesthetically 
valuable that normatively supports our aesthetic enjoyment of them.  
Compare this with Aristotle’s virtuous actions: their capacity to produce pleasure (in 
virtuous people) is not what makes these actions good, ethically speaking, but rather it is their 
being good that is worthy of pleasure. Similarly, on VMP, their power to please is not what 
makes aesthetically valuable objects good, aesthetically speaking, but rather it is their being good 
that it is worthy of pleasure.  
Moreover,  metaphysically, VMP is committed to a claim that at least one contemporary 
aesthetic hedonist rejects, the claim that “a mind-independent quality” is such as to merit “an 
attitude of affective appraisal” (Matthen, 2018: 22). On VMP, aesthetic value is metaphysically 
mind-independent in the following sense:  the specific aesthetic value of any specific 
aesthetically valuable object is not a feeling or a projection of a subject’s feeling, but a value 
property that resides in this object by supervening on (or being realized by) a particular 
combination of this object’s mind-independent properties. Specific instantiations of aesthetic 
value supervene on properties such as a particular shade of color, allusions, fine acting, pace, 
rhythm, expressiveness, characters, shape of sentences, symbolism, drama, wit, and so on and so 
forth. It is a value that objects have in virtue of having mind-independent aesthetic and non-
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aesthetic, physical and non-physical (but rather cognitive, historical etc.) properties such as the 
ones just mentioned.   
This list of properties that realize instantiations of aesthetic value is in principle open-
ended. Qualities like ‘boring’ or ‘inelegant’ may realize an instantiation of aesthetic value as 
long as they are such as to enhance the overall value of the object. VMP thus provides only a thin 
constraint on the content of aesthetic value: aesthetic value is such as to merit the kind of 
pleasure I define below, but the properties that realize instantiations of this value—the properties 
that we refer to in order to explain why an object instantiates this value and thus merits 
pleasure—may differ greatly.  
Given the great variety of such value-making properties of different objects and 
artworks—a variety that has traditionally been correlated with theses about the non-inferential 
nature of aesthetic judgment and its complicated relation to general principles16—I take VMP’s 
paper-thin constraint on content to be a virtue of the view.17 The most we can say about the 
content of this value other than its being that which merits aesthetic pleasure is that often, but not 
always, the properties on which instantiations of this value supervene are holistically related to 
each other and to the object as a whole, such that they are value-making properties not 
monadically, but by virtue of their relation to each other and to the object as a whole. This, 
though, is true of many instantiations of this value, but not of all (not, for example, of a beautiful 
 
16 E.g., Sibley (2011), Mothersill (1984).  
17 Cf. Jacobson (2011) on the attractiveness of characterizing a value like aesthetic value in terms 
of its fitting attitude given the difficulty of finding any one set of (natural) properties on which it 
supervenes. 
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but simple shade of purple). And it is not distinctive of these instantiations. Other, non-
aesthetically valuable objects (notably, organisms) may have analogous holistic unities. So, such 
a holistic character is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on aesthetically valuable 
objects, but it is prevalent.  
If VMP is in any sense a response-dependent theory, then, it is so “semantically” or 
“conceptually” insofar as it holds that aesthetic value cannot be characterized independently of 
the human capacity to feel.18 
 
Finally, the meriting connection is unconditional but defeasible in the following way: the 
facts that bear on aesthetic value serve as unconditional, but also defeasible, and not all-things-
considered normative support of aesthetic pleasure. This means that, while the normative support 
for feeling aesthetic pleasure in aesthetically valuable objects is unconditional, it might be 
defeated by pragmatic, moral, political and social considerations, or outweighed by what might 
be called “sensibility” or “personal” considerations (those that are grounded in our particular 
sensibilities and life-styles).19 Such considerations might normatively support not liking an 
aesthetically valuable object in specific circumstances. 
 
18 Cf. D’Arms and Jacobson, 2006: 190, Tappolet, 2016: 116-21.  
19 I am not committed to the claim that all these belong to the same type of considerations. It may 
well be that only the moral among these considerations defeat the normative support for aesthetic 
pleasure by providing normative support against feeling it. The other considerations seem not 
provide normative support against feeling it, but for not putting oneself in the position of feeling 
it (they concern the conditions for feeling it not directly the feeling).  
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Suppose that The Triumph of the Will, The Tale of Genji and The Velvet Underground & 
Nico are aesthetically valuable. Then The Triumph of the Will merits everyone aesthetic pleasure, 
even if there are moral considerations against feeling this pleasure, moral considerations that 
constitute reasons against feeling it.20 Similarly, aesthetically enjoying The Tale of Genji is 
unconditionally merited, even if no one can fully enjoy the novel without knowing the language 
in which it was written—the language of the high courts in Japan’s Heian period (c. 11 century 
AD), a language that, according to historians, were unreadable as early as a century after it was 
written—and even if most of us have pragmatic and personal reasons not to spend the time 
required for learning this language and to familiarize ourselves with the culture of high courtiers 
in Heian Japan. Finally, the Velvet Underground’s album The Velvet Underground & Nico 
merits everyone’s aesthetic pleasure, even if some of us have pragmatic and personal reasons—
reasons that are grounded in our personal styles and sensibilities—not to spend the time, effort, 
and plausibly pain that it may take for us to cultivate the kind of ear, the kind of sensibility that is 
required in order to be in the position to enjoy the album. That is, The Velvet Underground & 
Nico merits aesthetic pleasure even from those of us who were raised by classical enthusiastic 
parents, who have not allowed any music that was created past the 1900’s to be played at home, 
 
20 This is not to embrace autonomism, the view that moral value has no bearing on aesthetic 
value. Rather, the claim is that in cases where a moral defect in a work does not undermine its 
overall aesthetic value (as is plausibly the case of Triumph of the Will), and in cases where a 
moral defect related to a work is not integral to its aesthetic character (as perhaps are the moral 
flows of Bill Cosby), the normative support for aesthetic pleasure may be defeated by the moral 
considerations against enjoying the Triumph of the Will and the Cosby Show.  
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sent us to classical music lessons and appreciation classes, and made us such classicists ourselves 
that hearing any note of late 60’s rock makes us shriek with pain.  
The point is this: it is highly plausible that many of us have good pragmatic reasons not 
to invest the time and effort that it takes to acquire the necessary background (and/or personal 
reasons not to cultivate the sensibility) required in order to so much as be in the position to enjoy 
or like many objects of aesthetic value. But this does not undermine the core claim of VMP, the 
claim that aesthetically valuable objects merit aesthetic pleasure unconditionally: they 
unconditionally but defeasibly support aesthetic enjoyment.21   
 
21 Throughout the paper I use the phrase “aesthetic objects merit and thus normatively support 
aesthetic pleasure” rather than “provide reasons to feel this pleasure” mainly because of (1) 
worries that affective attitudes cannot be based on reasons, and (2) issues stemming from the 
notorious “Wrong Kind of Reasons” Problem [WKR]. Briefly, (1) MaGuire (2018) claims that, 
given that reasons are facts necessarily capable of conflicting with each other and of being 
combined together to explain further normative facts, while the facts that normatively support 
affective attitudes are not, there could be no reasons for affective attitudes. While I believe that 
his argument is unsound, here I will only note that nothing I say depends on there being reasons 
for feeling aesthetic pleasure. I am committed only to this pleasure being normatively supported 
by aesthetically valuable objects.  Since MaGuire believes in the existence of normative facts 
that show affective attitudes to be either fitting or unfitting (and only resist calling them 
‘reasons’), even if his argument were sound, it would have no implications for mine.   (2) The 
task of explaining how VMP avoids the WKR problem must remain for another paper, but here I 
can emphasize that in this paper I do not explain aesthetic value in terms of reasons but in terms 
 18 
 
2.2 The affective attitude merited by aesthetic value, or “aesthetic pleasure”22 
I call the affective attitude that aesthetically valuable objects merit “aesthetic pleasure” [AP], and 
characterize it by sketching its eight structural characteristics. The sketch presupposes that a 
formal, structural or functional approach to pleasure as such is superior to phenomenological 
approaches (also known as hedonic tone approaches).23 In other words, I assume that what is 
common to all pleasures cannot be captured by a uniform kind of affective phenomenology. 
Rather, pleasure as such has to be characterized in terms of its form or structure and in terms of 
the way that it shapes, modifies or affects pleasurable activities or experiences. Similarly, I 
characterize AP neither in terms of its phenomenological feel nor in terms of its particular 
objects and contents but in terms of its structure, and the functional role it plays in modifying 
certain experiences. 
 
of merit and worthiness (or fittingness), where this is understood both as a particular species of 
correctness and as responsiveness owed to a specific value (at one and the same time). Given 
that, my preferred response to the WKR problem consists of an explanation of this particular 
species of correctness and responsiveness, and the way in which they serve as internal standards 
of aesthetic pleasure . For a drop in the ocean of the literature on the WKR problem, see, 
D’Arms and Jacobson (2000b), Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004),  Hieronymi (2005), 
and Gertken & Kiesewetter (2017). 
22 2.2 and section 3 largely overlap with two sections of my (forthcoming).  
23 Cf. Strohl (2012) and Aydede (2018).  
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Note that the following eight characteristics are introduced in order of generality: from 
the most general characteristics of pleasure as such, to the most specific characteristics of 
aesthetic pleasure. We start by what seems to be true of all pleasures, and gradually zoom in to 
get a close-up on aesthetic pleasure.  
 
(1) Affective: AP is an affective attitude, which, as such, has an affective phenomenology. 
But this phenomenology neither unifies it with all kinds of pleasure (such that it is felt every time 
we feel pleasure), nor unifies all instances of aesthetic pleasure: different instances of this 
pleasure may feel very differently. 
Moreover, AP is not experienced as a separate occurrent state, but rather as a positively 
affective way of engaging with an object (e.g., by perceiving, attending to, imagining or 
evaluating it). 
 
(2) Self-maintenance: why call the affective attitude that is merited aesthetic value a 
pleasure? Primarily because it is characterized by a positive affective valence that is manifested 
by the future-directedness that is a mark of all pleasures simply qua pleasures. Qua pleasure, the 
pleasure in aesthetically valuable objects, like the pleasures in food, sex, conversation, learning 
and others, is self-maintaining. It tends towards its own continuation such that one typically 
wishes to, and tends to, retain the same pleasurable experience.24  
 
24 Cf. Kant: “we linger over the consideration of the beautiful because this consideration 
strengthens and reproduces itself” (2000: 107). Sizer (2013, p. 220) presents empirical research 
in support of the view that this is a characteristic of pleasure as such.  
 20 
The combination of these two first characteristics entitles us to call this attitude a 
“pleasure,” not simply “liking” or an affective kind of appreciation. 
 
(3) Holistic Complexity: Ordinarily (but not always), we enjoy an aesthetically valuable 
object in light of enjoying something or other about it:25 I enjoy Colm Toibin’s House of Names 
in light of enjoying the vivid and detailed imagining of the first-person perspectives of 
Clytemnestra, Electra and Orestes, its psychological depth and power, the charged emotional 
tension between the characters, the transparent and succinct language, and the way these all 
complement and reinforce each other. I like Paul McCobb’s bench because I like the angle of the 
legs, the color of the drawer, the shape of the knob, its simplicity, and the way these fit together. 
We typically enjoy an excellent work, an aesthetically valuable artifact or a natural object as a 
whole in light of enjoying something about it, be it, its gracefulness, fine acting or even 
disturbing and painful power, when this disturbing or painful power fits the other features of the 
object so as to contribute to its overall aesthetic excellence.26 
This holistic complexity of AP is crucial for properly understanding how even what is 
regarded as “painful art” merits AP. Works such as Michael Haneke’s films, Thomas Hardy’s 
 
25 This is not a necessary condition of AP: we may correctly feel AP in the beauty of a simple 
shade of color, or the elegance of a simple curve in virtue of nothing other than their simple and 
analyzable beauty and elegance. This holistic complexity of the pleasure corresponds to the 
holistic complexity of most, but not all, aesthetically valuable objects mentioned above. In 
neither case is it a necessary or sufficient condition.  
26 See Strohl for other structurally analogous pleasures that involve pain (2012: 210).  
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novels, Lauren Groff’s short stories and many classical tragedies, to mention only a few are 
disturbing; experiencing them is often painful. But this is no reason to deny that they merit AP. 
On VMP, works such as these are worthy of AP in part because experiencing them is disturbing. 
The claim is not that we do always feel pleasure in great but painful art under standard 
conditions, but rather that painful art may merit aesthetic pleasure no less than non-painful art. 
Painful art is no reason to deny that aesthetically excellent works merit pleasure.  
 
(4) Revealing value: the pleasure at the heart of VMP is a cognitive kind of affective 
experience (analogous in some respects to non-affective perception) insofar as it purports to 
reveal the value of its object,27 and, when correct, it indeed presents the object as having the 
value it has.28 In successful cases, we apprehend the value of the object in and through feeling 
pleasure in it.29 In these cases, we enjoy the object as aesthetically valuable in the way that it is, 
 
27 Though I will not argue for it here, I also believe that, in typical cases, AP presents itself as 
appropriate or merited. Cf. Skorupski (1999: 445) and Goldie (2004: 253) on the emotions as 
typically presenting themselves as “justified” by their objects.  
28 Recent empirical science lands support to this cognitive nature of the pleasure in art, e.g., 
Christenson, 2018, section 7.  
29 Other than in the context of interpreting historical figures (e.g., Shapiro 2018), very little 
philosophical work has been done on the cognitive character of pleasure (aesthetic or otherwise). 
Nevertheless, in the literature on the emotions, there is a wide consensus about the cognitive and 
(re)presentational nature of affective experiences (e.g., McDowell (1998), Goldie (2000), 
Johnston (2000), D’Arms and Jacobson (2000b), Milona (2016), Tappolet (2016)). For a 
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without necessarily first believing that it is aesthetically valuable in the way that it is or first non-
affectively perceiving it to be so. We may, immediately, grasp the object’s value by enjoying it.30  
Note that aesthetic pleasure makes the object’s value available to the feeling subject by 
modifying experiences such as perceiving, imagining, and attending. Aydede (2018) is right that 
thinking of pleasure as modifying other experiences should not be more mysterious than thinking 
that being fast or slow modifies an activity like dancing. I’d like to add that it should similarly 
not be mysterious that different ways of engaging with objects (e.g., pleasantly or not) do not 
only allow us to experience them differently, but also, by so doing, to discover new features of 
them, for example, their aesthetic value. 
 
(5) Rational assessment: AP is always subject to a rational question “why,” such that if the 
object is shown not to merit AP, the feeling subject is under rational pressure to re-experience 
the object, and be open to, indeed try to, revise her affective attitude, that is, try and align her 
feelings to what the object indeed merits.31  
 
welcome recent exception that stresses the representational nature of the affective experiences of 
aesthetic properties, see Goffin 2018. Our proposals still significantly differ (e.g., concerning the 
nature and structure of the relevant affective experiences, the value of a sentimentalist approach 
in aesthetics, aesthetic reasons).  
30 Cf. “Affective experiences alone [independently of perceptual experiences] can represent 
aesthetic properties” (Goffin, 2018: 11). For a fuller defense of the cognitive power of pleasure, 
see my (forthcoming).   
31 For an elaboration and defense, see Gorodeisky and Marcus (2018), Gorodeisky (2018).  
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(6) Universal: aesthetically valuable objects merit everyone’s pleasure, even if, as I 
explained above, the normative support for universally feeling pleasure may be, and often are, 
defeated by other (e.g., pragmatic, moral, personal) considerations.32  
  
(7) Self-contained: AP is self-contained such that it is taken in an object independently of 
its suitability for any further end. Aesthetically valuable objects merit pleasure merely by virtue 
of being aesthetically valuable, not by virtue of their contribution to any further end. 
 
 
32 I believe that this defeasibility undermines possible worries about the universal scope of AP, 
particularly, worries that aesthetic value cannot merit pleasure from everyone because of the 
deep cultural differences among us (Matthen 2018), and because of our meaningfully different 
personalities, which, as meaningful, should remain different and distinct (Nehamas 2007). 
Briefly, I respond that, even though aesthetically valuable objects merit everyone’s AP, different 
people may have practical, pragmatic and personal reasons not to put themselves in the position 
to enjoy these objects (e.g., since it would take too much time and effort). And so people may be 
justified in not enjoying a great variety of aesthetically valuable objects. In other words, 
universal merit is fully compatible with (1) cultural and personal diversity (of people and 
artifacts), (2) the greater and lesser difficulty that different people often face in trying to enjoy 
the same aesthetically valuable objects, and (3) the fact that not enjoying certain aesthetically 
valuable objects is often justified.  
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(8) Background: for the most part (but not always), to feel this pleasure, one has to have 
certain minimal background experiences, such as familiarity with related objects, and practice in 
looking, listening, attending and related ways of experiencing objects.33  
 
Recall that these characteristics were introduced according to their generality. While the 
first two of these structural features seem to characterize all pleasures, and the first three 
characterize most pleasures, universalization may characterize only very few pleasures, being 
self-contained seems to characterize mainly aesthetic pleasure (but perhaps also, depending on 
your moral outlook etc., certain pleasures in virtuous people and virtuous actions), and the last 
feature may characterize only aesthetic pleasure.34 
 
 
33 These same characteristics shape aesthetic displeasure: aesthetic demerit normatively supports 
a feeling of displeasure that is a complex feeling (with an affective phenomenology) that tends 
toward its discontinuation. This displeasure reveals the object, it is rationally assessable, it is not 
private but universal, it does not depend on the failure of the object to fulfill any additional ends, 
and it typically requires certain background experiences and familiarity. 
34 The main differences between moral pleasures and AP (beyond whether or not the former are 
self-contained) concern (1) the fact the moral pleasures are taken in the fittingness of an action or 
a character to a particular requirement, principle, rule or law, while the pleasure in aesthetically 
valuable objects is independent of any such fittingness and (2) the different backgrounds 
required in order to be in the position to feel moral pleasures and AP respectively.  
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2.3 No-Priority  
FAA that characterize the relevant affective attitude as cognitive or perceptual (e.g., McDowell 
(1984), Wiggins (1987)) are often accused of circularity. I too offer a kind of FAA on which AP 
is cognitive and analogous to perception. Yet, my account is not circular in the relevant sense 
insofar as it describes the attitude by appeal to eight structural characteristics independently of 
all but the thinnest presupposition about the content of this attitude. Still, VMP may also be 
regarded as non-viciously circular, or, as it is often called, a “no-priority” (McDowell, 1984:160) 
view of this value—a view on which the value and the attitude must be explained reciprocally. 
This is because one may reasonably ask: why is aesthetic pleasure characterized by these eight 
features? The answer is because they best reflect what intuitively seems to be the thinnest formal 
profile of most of the objects that we correctly appreciate for their aesthetic value. In this sense, 
the characterization of the attitude appeals to a thin, formal and pre-theoretical understanding of 
the value, just as much as the characterization of the value appeals to a thin formal understanding 
of the attitude it merits. This is what is meant by a no-priority view of value. Still, even if the 
account is circular in this way, it is not viciously circular thanks to its explanatory power and the 
inferiority of any attempt to elucidate aesthetic value “without that detour” through AP. As I 
argue below, compared to other approaches, VMP is the most viable and the most explanatory 
potent account of aesthetic value.35 To quote Wiggins:  
 
Circularity as such is no objection to [a view of value], provided that the offending formulation is 
also true. . . . by tracing out such a circle, [one] hopes to elucidate the concept of value by 
 
35 Even critics of no-priority accounts acknowledge that the “beautiful and other aesthetic 
properties” (Jacobson 2011) may well admit only of a no-priority account.  
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displaying it in its actual involvement with the sentiments. One would not  . . .  have sufficiently 
elucidated what value is without that detour. (1987: 189) 
 
3. Why VMP?  
In this section, I present a few observations that support the idea that aesthetic valuable objects 
merit the affective attitude I call aesthetic pleasure. Think of them as considerations in favor of 
taking this idea seriously (but not as conclusive arguments for VMP).  
First, consider the opening lines of the paper. Recall how often we communicate our 
aesthetic responses and recommendations in terms of our likes and dislikes. VMP has an 
explanation of this, and is supported by the phenomenon.  
Second, notice how intuitive is the idea that at least certain kinds of feelings reveal 
certain kinds of values.  Understanding that a person is kind, amiable or sexist on a certain 
occasion is often made possible and explained by feeling gratitude or companionship or 
indignation. The claim is not that these feelings are necessary for believing the situation to be 
such or for judging the person thusly. We may well be able to gain knowledge of these 
propositions, or at least a warranted belief that this situation requires kindness, and that this 
person is sexist on the basis of testimony alone, independently of feeling, and so we might gain 
epistemic access to these values and disvalues independently of feeling. Yet the all too common 
nature of the following scenario and of others of its kind strongly suggests that such values can 
be, and often are, revealed through feelings alone: I may be unable to articulate fully and exactly 
enough why a person was gentle on this occasion, but add, “but I am quite confident; I felt it. 
Didn’t you feel it too?” Such bit of discourse is quite ordinary, suggesting that we do commonly 
think of feelings as revealing certain values and disvalues to us.   
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Relatedly, many aspects of our lives, many values, call for and merit, not only beliefs and 
actions, but certain kinds of feelings. A tragic hero, like Oedipus, deserves pity from everyone. 
Being responsive to his tragedy requires that we feel pity. The same goes for those people and 
situations that call for empathy, for certain forms of collective forgiveness, for moral outrage and 
many other feelings. Why can’t aesthetic value be, similarly, that which calls for and merit a 
particular kind of feeling? Why can’t aesthetic value belong to “A familiar set of concepts with 
an especially tight connection to the human emotional repertoire [which] concerns the 
sentimental values,” where these values are connected to sentiments by meriting them? As 
mentioned above, this is a familiar idea in meta-ethics. Placing aesthetic value alongside these 
affective (or “sentimental”) values and disvalues helps to make VMP plausible, and to point to 
the virtues it shares with Neo-Sentimentalist theories of value. For example, like the latter, VMP 
does justice not only to the connection between sentiments and values, but, at the same time, to 
the well-noticed gap between sentimental appearance and evaluative reality, and, so, to the 
possibility of erroneous aesthetic evaluations. Moreover, given the notorious challenges facing 
any attempt to characterize this value by appeal to a list of properties (2.1)—by appeal to a 
robust picture of the content of this value—VMP’s characterization of this value in terms of a 
merited affective attitude is a virtue. These are considerable strengths of the view. 
Now consider how well-suited VMP is to explain the shape and the aim of aesthetic 
exchanges, and, correspondingly how the latter supports VMP. Intuitively, at least, it seems that 
other than in very special circumstances, when we recommend a film or an album to others, we 
don’t wish them merely to believe that the film or the album is valuable in the way we claim it is. 
Rather, we want them to enjoy it for themselves. While others may well be able to believe, on the 
basis of our recommendation, that these works are valuable, such a belief is rarely the aim of 
 28 
aesthetic recommendations. Mere belief devoid of pleasure would, most often, be accepted with a 
sense of disappointment, not with a sense of successfully achieving one’s aim in making the 
recommendation in the first place. For example, Abigail, my friend, may well tell me that, after 
my recommendation and two months of reading the novels, she believes me that Elena Ferrante’s 
tetralogy the Neapolitan Novels is aesthetically excellent. But she may add that she “must 
confess” (as she puts it), that it is not to her liking. Hearing Abigail, I’d most likely be 
disappointed, thinking that “confession” is just the right term to describe her speech act, a term 
that captures a certain failure of responsiveness. And believing the novels to be aesthetically 
valuable as she might, I would nonetheless think that Abigail missed something—the beauty of 
the novels. Aesthetic exchanges aim to facilitate the hearer’s own (responsive and cognitive) 
pleasure.36  
This understanding of the aim or logic of the practice is often shared by both aesthetic 
affectivists, like VMP advocates, and non-affectivists. Consider, for example, the non-affectivist 
Noël Carroll. Even though he recently argued against affectivism concerning the aesthetic 
appreciation of art, he nonetheless agreed with the affectivist that, by cultivating understanding 
of a work in others, we aim to cultivate in them positive feelings toward it. According to Carroll, 
the relation between understanding and pleasure or liking “is undoubtedly the thinking that lies 
behind art-appreciation courses. Understanding the sonata form, it is hoped, the student will 
cultivate a liking of it.  And undeniably that sometimes happens; indeed, it even happens often” 
(Carroll, 2016:7). The aim, not only of aesthetic communications and recommendations, but 
even of aesthetic education, according to this line, is to cultivate liking.  
 
36 Nor is belief the aim of criticism. On that, see Cross 2017.  
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Likewise, even those who deny that “we ought to like great art,” think that, “[a]rt critics 
view as truism the claim that one ought to like good art” (Hein, 1967: 209). Why do the experts 
in this practice, who are trained to, and skilled in achieving its aim, take this as a truism, unless 
they were indeed aiming to get their readers to like good art?  
If the goal of aesthetic recommendations and conversations is indeed to facilitate one’s 
liking or pleasure, not only one’s beliefs that the value obtain, then VMP has a great explanation 
of this. Briefly, this is the explanation: since to evaluate something to have aesthetic merit is to 
evaluate it to merit pleasure, doing so by feeling this pleasure is not simply a way of tracking the 
facts about the work’s value, but, also, at one stroke, a way of responding to it in the way that is 
non-contingently tied to its having that value: it is a way of being responsive to its having the 
value. To evaluate an object in and by feeling AP is to evaluate it correctly while, at the same 
time, to respond to it as that evaluation entails that one should. In contrast, the non-affective 
evaluator has true beliefs about the object’s value, but she is not true to its having this value. Her 
states are true but not responsive. (This is another way of saying that the correctness of AP is 
irreducible to theoretical correctness, that is, to mere accuracy or truth. Instead, it is constrained 
by responsiveness too.) And, notice, what the affective evaluator does right that the non-affective 
evaluator does not is to respond in the way that lies at the heart of the kind of value the 
evaluation of which is in question (in both cases). It is not that the affective evaluator gets ‘two 
check marks’ (one for truth and one for responsiveness) and the non-affective evaluator gets only 
one (for truth). The setup is not that of ‘2 (achievements) vs. 1 (achievement).’ Rather, the 
contrast between the two evaluators is of ‘the relevant achievement vs. none,’ since, in line with 
the observations about the logic of aesthetic exchanges, belief about aesthetically valuable 
objects is at best the starting point. At worst, it is beside the point. 
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Now note what might be regarded as a variant of Moore’s Paradox concerning aesthetic 
merit. Consider the statement, “Henry James’ The Ambassadors is a great novel but it merits no 
liking.” Intuitively, this claim sounds odd, requiring further explanation. Why is that so? On a 
straightforward explanation, this is so because aesthetic greatness merits enjoying or liking the 
work. This is exactly the core commitment of VMP.  
Finally, even the non-affectivist admits, “nobody doubts pleasure’s close alliance with 
aesthetic value” (Lopes, 2018: 199). 
The view gets further support when compared with other candidates. That’s the task of 
the next two sections.  
 
4. Against Hedonism 
One problem with these observations is that some of them may support hedonism about aesthetic 
value as much as they support VMP. But VMP is to be preferred to aesthetic hedonism about 
value, not on account of its way of doing justice to, and explaining, the phenomena recorded in 
these observations, but on account of hedonism’s (1) failure to explain what is wrong with what 
James Shelly instructively called aesthetic overvaluations,37 (2) difficulty to propose plausible 
standards of correctness for aesthetic evaluations, standards that do justice to the practice, and (3) 
inability to explain what I take to be a strong intuition, put forward and defended by Susan Wolf 
(2013): the intuition that some aesthetically valuable objects would have been aesthetically 
valuable even if they did not benefit anyone, hedonically or otherwise.   
 
37 Shelley 2011.   
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 Shelley shows, convincingly, I believe, that the hedonist cannot explain the problem with 
aesthetically overvaulting objects, or in my terms, the problem with liking objets more than they 
aesthetically merit. Instead of rehashing his arguments, I will develop the last two worries just 
mentioned, focusing on Mohan Matthen’s recent and most promising version of aesthetic 
hedonism (2017, 2018). According to Matthen, “[A]n artwork’s merit rests on the feelings that it 
arouses in its intended audience” (2018: 20). On his view, “we judge objects to have aesthetic 
merit when they are a good fit for our psychological attitudes” (2017: 15, cf. 20).38  Are there 
reasons to believe that VMP is to be preferred to a hedonic account like Matthen’s? Here I 
present only two such reasons.  
First, think about the normativity of aesthetic disagreements. When we disagree about the 
pleasure of eating oatmeal for breakfast or the pleasure of running on the beach on a crisp 
morning in late Spring, the only standards of correctness available to us to settle the 
disagreement, if any, are robustly relativized and private. In these cases, there seems to be no 
room for cognitive fault: if we disagree about these two matters, both of our judgments may be 
correct given that eating oatmeal in the morning and running on a crisp morning fit my 
constitution, preferences and needs, and thus tend to give me pleasure, but strongly disagree with 
your constitution, preferences and needs, and thus tend to displease you.  If so, both of us are 
correct. No one is at fault. A disagreement about, say, the pleasure in beholding Gustave 
Caillebotte’s The Floor Scrapers, is different. There is a growing consensus that, at least in many 
cases of aesthetic disagreement, one of us is at fault: we cannot both be right.39 Aesthetic 
 
38 And see Matthen’s central hedonist brief at the opening of the paper.  
39 E.g., Hopkins (2001), Gorodeisky and Marcus (2018). 
 32 
disagreements and agreements, the line goes, are a matter of non-private, non-relativized 
correctness, and any proper account of aesthetic value should be able to explain that. What 
would the hedonist say?  
Matthen briefly addresses the issue of correctness, claiming that he wishes to account for 
correctness in terms of “the way that is maximally productive of this kind of pleasure provided 
that this does not contradict fact” (2017: 20). But, I worry that the notion of “fact” at stake is 
insufficient for the kind of correctness required by the majority of aesthetic disagreements. By 
“fact,” Matthen seems to mean “plain facts”—facts about whether or not, to use his example, 
Pride and Prejudice is about zombies. But such facts cannot settle many a familiar aesthetic 
disagreement, not even those that seem most simple. Consider the following case. If I enjoy the 
novel as perceptive and you do not, but enjoy it as a reminder of your daughter’s good qualities, 
one of us is wrong, even if neither evaluation contradicts the (plain) facts, that is, even if 
Elisabeth Bennett indeed resembles your daughter in the relevant respect. Matthen’s explanation 
fails here. Appealing to those experiences that maximize pleasure and to plain rather than value-
laden facts about the work, at best explain these kinds of normative failure inelegantly. At worst, 
Matthen’s strategy doesn’t explain correctness at all. Valuable features of the work—those that 
constitute its value independently of whether they produce pleasure—provide simpler and more 
successful explanations. On VMP, one of us is wrong because one of us fails to apprehend and 
be responsive to the features that in fact make the novel valuable and thus merit aesthetic 
pleasure; full stop.  
Second, and very briefly, the hedonist cannot account for those aesthetically valuable 
objects, particularly artworks, which are, in Wolf’s memorable phrase, “good for nothings” 
(2013). The bare bones of the argument is this: even though the life of no one may have been 
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worse off without certain works and objects—Wolf speaks mainly about the paintings of the 
Dutch painter Gerrit Dou—those works would have still been great artworks. Suppose that no 
one benefited from Dou’s paintings: Dou could have been a flourishing scientist, and we could 
have marveled instead at the works of another excellent Dutch painter of the same period. Dou’s 
works may have not benefited anyone, hedonically or otherwise. But, the intuition goes, they 
would have nonetheless been valuable even if, counterfactually, they may have not benefitted 
anyone, let alone given pleasure to anyone. If so, it seems that the value of great artworks cannot 
be explained by their benefits, hedonic or otherwise.  
Of course, the hedonist can deny this counterfactual. But I find it a powerful one. The 
hedonist, then, owes us a further story: either deny the counterfactual or show us how hedonism 
may account for it. Since VMP does not explain aesthetic value in terms of its benefiting anyone, 
but as a value that merits pleasure insofar as it is good independently of its power to please, 
VMP is to be preferred to hedonism on this count too.  
 
5. Against (Non-Affectivist) Doxastic and Practical Competitors 
Proponents of VMP don’t deny that aesthetic value merits and thus justifies beliefs and a variety 
of different actions. I claim only that aesthetic value cannot be characterized as that which merits 
either the belief that it obtains or actions that promote it. I deny that it can be characterized in 
terms of normative support for belief or action. Why? Most generally because of what seems like 
the derivative and (counterfactually) dependent nature of these doxastic and practical attitudes 
when it comes to aesthetic value. Think of this (counterfactual) dependence as follows: the facts 
that bear on whether an object is aesthetically valuable merit and thus justify (serve as normative 
support for) believing that they are so and acting in ways that promote their being such only if 
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they also merit and thus justify AP. Whether an aesthetically valuable object merits the belief 
that the value obtains and an action that promotes this value counterfactually depends on whether 
it merits AP. For example, if facts about Ziggy Stardust do not justify AP, they do not justify the 
belief that it is aesthetically valuable.  If facts about the Cathedral of the Holy Trinity in Dresden 
do not justify AP, they do not justify actions for promoting its aesthetic value, such as conserving 
the cathedral. This seems hard to deny. Let me explain this in more detail.  
 
5.1 Belief?  
What is the problem with characterizing aesthetic value as that which merits and justifies belief?  
 First, recall the discussion of the logic of aesthetic exchanges and recommendations 
(section 3). If aesthetic value merited belief (alone) merely by being the kind of value that it is, 
then why there would ever be a sense of disappointment if our exchanges and recommendations 
yielded only belief but not aesthetic liking of the sort I described above? If all we said when we 
told a friend that, say, the new Jerry Lewis album is beautiful is that the album merits her belief 
that it is beautiful, why should we be disappointed, or think that she missed something, if she 
claimed that she believed that the album was aesthetically valuable, but did not like it, did not 
wish to listen to it ever again and so on and so forth? Our disappointment, dissatisfaction, and the 
sense of failing to achieve our aim in response to a friend’s claim to believe that an object we 
recommended is aesthetically valuable but not to like it suggest that, without further explanation, 
aesthetic value cannot merit belief simply by virtue of being the kind of value that it is.  
Second, VMP is to be preferred to any doxastic account of aesthetic value by virtue of its 
explanatory power. Think of this as an argument to the best explanation. The relevant 
explanandum is a common intuition about a tension between two apparently opposing 
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characteristics of aesthetic evaluations. On the one hand, often at least, we seem to require a 
certain kind of autonomy of our aesthetic evaluations—we often expect and even require that 
they be made on the basis of one’s own powers and experiences, first-personally, not merely on 
the basis of the powers of another. We may, for example, rightly refuse to accept a 
recommendation or an evaluation of a work, if it is not based on one’s first-person experience of 
it, just as we may refuse to accept a recommendation of a dish that one never tasted oneself. On 
the other hand, we often regard aesthetic evaluations as (in some important respect) cognitive: 
we seek, for example, to settle disagreements by assuming that, between two disagreeing parties, 
one is at fault, at least in many paradigmatic cases. An account of aesthetic value should, ideally, 
account for the tension between the (at least seeming) first-personal and the (at least seeming) 
cognitive nature of (at least many) aesthetic evaluations.40  
VMP can accommodate this tension better than any doxastic competitor since, on VMP, 
the attitude fittingly appropriate to aesthetic value is a cognitive kind of pleasure that no one can 
feel for another. As cognitive, though, this pleasure purports to present (and when correct, 
succeeds in presenting) this value. So, VMP can explain both the common requirement to 
evaluate an aesthetically valuable object first-personally and the (at least seeming) cognitive 
nature of aesthetic evaluations, as those that could either be fitting or unfitting to their object. On 
that count, friends of VMP fare better than friends of the doxastic picture since the latter need 
some additional mechanism, over and above their basic account of aesthetic value, in order to 
 
40 Hopkins (2001), Gorodeisky and Marcus (2018), Nguyen (forthcoming.). 
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explain this dual nature of aesthetic evaluation. VMP is to be preferred to its doxastic 
competitors on account of its explanatory power.41  
 
5.2. Action? 
Aesthetically valuable objects typically merit and justify many kinds of action, for example, they 
merit their exhibition, preservation and conservation. They indeed merit these and many other 
actions, so much so that we may not do right by them if we fail on this practical front. 
Nevertheless, VMP is to be preferred to any practical characterization of aesthetic value for the 
following reasons.  
First, no practical account of aesthetic value can be as unified as VMP. VMP gives a 
unified picture of the attitude that this value makes appropriate—it is AP.  The actions that 
aesthetically valuable objects merit are various, and depend on the peculiarities of each one of 
them. So, there is no one action that aesthetically valuable objects merit qua aesthetically 
valuable. There can be no unified practical account of aesthetic value.    
  Moreover, it seems that actions and the normative support for them do not directly bear 
on whether an object is aesthetically valuable. They bear on this question only indirectly via AP 
and the normative support for it. The normative support for actions regarding aesthetically 
valuable objects counterfactually depend on the normative support for AP such that, if facts 
about an object did not serve as a normative support for this pleasure, they would not serve as a 
normative support for acting in ways that promote this value. Translating Elena Ferrante’s 
Neapolitan Novels to English on account of their aesthetic excellence is justified only if the facts 
 
41 For a full version of this argument, see Gorodeisky and Marcus (2018).  
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that are taken to justify this action also justify aesthetic pleasure.42 Thomas Branchick’s (of the 
High Museum in Atlanta) recent conservation of Giovanni Francesco Barbieri’s Christ and the 
Samaritan Woman is justified as an act of conserving the painting on account of its aesthetic 
merit only if the facts that are taken to support this action also support AP in the painting.   Any 
action done on account of, or in promotion of, aesthetic value is justified by facts about the 
object only if these facts also justify AP. And so any normative support for acting on account of, 
or in promotion of, aesthetic value counterfactually depends on the normative support for AP. 
VMP is not only more unified, but also more basic and more fundamental than any practical 
account of aesthetic value. 
 
 
6. Ending with the Source of Aesthetic Value 
In this paper, I attempted to explain only what marks a value as an aesthetic value, not to explain 
the source of this value. I wished to remain neutral, even agnostic, about the normative question 
“what makes aesthetically valuable objects valuable?” The only commitment I made in this 
respect was “negative”: VMP involves a commitment to the claim that it is neither pleasure nor 
the power to please that makes objects aesthetically valuable.  A hedonic view of the source of 
aesthetic value is, at best, unsatisfactory. I also suggested that the distinctive instantiations of 
aesthetic value greatly vary from object to object in part because they supervene on the specific 
response-independent properties of each specific object and the ways in which these properties 
interact with each other.   
 
42 The example is an example of acting for a (specific) reason: the action of translating the novel 
on account of their aesthetic value (rather than merely the action of translating the novels).  
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Nevertheless, in concluding, I would gesture towards my favorite answer to the 
normative question. This answer is primitivist in spirit: an answer that trades on the notion of a 
“basic value,” where this refers to a value that need not be analyzed further. On such a primitivist 
picture, there is much that we can say about the value of specific aesthetically valuable objects. 
The Ambassadors is aesthetically excellent on account of its fine sentences, which are loaded 
with meaning, on account of its intricate characters, which are expressed even by their tone of 
voice, and so on and so forth.  The garden of the Meigetsuin temple in Kamakura (Japan) is 
beautiful on account of its summer hydrangeas, rock gardens, steps, bridges and the ways in 
which all of these complement each other. On the primitivist picture I like, most of what we can 
say in an answer to the normative question is that specific instantiations of aesthetic value are 
realized by the properties that these specific objects have and the ways in which those properties 
align with each other. It is those properties, in the particular ways in which they are deployed in 
specific works of art, natural objects, people, garments, furniture and other objects, that account 
for the specific instantiations of aesthetic value that each of these is.        
But while these specific questions about individual aesthetically valuable objects make a 
lot of sense, and are at the heart of our aesthetic conversations, recommendations, art criticisms 
and so forth, the general question “why are aesthetically valuable objects in general valuable or 
good?” makes as little sense as the questions “why are virtuous people good?” “why is a life of 
well-being good?” 
The core commitment of the primitivist picture is to the claim that aesthetically valuable 
objects are not aesthetically valuable or good because of any benefits that they may bring to 
human beings. Of course, these objects do benefit us; greatly benefit us, aesthetically, personally, 
cognitively, morally, in terms of our well-being and more. They are extremely significant to our 
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lives. But they are not valuable on that account. The primitivist I have in mind is committed only 
to a direction of explanation: aesthetically valuable objects benefit us because they are valuable. 
They are not valuable because they benefit us. But they are valuable, very valuable, aesthetically 
valuable, and as such, I have argued in this paper, they merit the affective attitude I call aesthetic 
liking or pleasure.43 
  
 
43 This paper was written mainly during the ASA-UBC summer seminar, “Beauty and Why it 
Matters.” It is hard to imagine a more productive and inspiring environment for a paper on 
aesthetic value. I am greatly indebted to the participants of this seminar and to its director, 
Dominic McIver Lopes, and to audiences at a meeting of the Auburn University Philosophical 
Society and at the 2019 meeting of the Pacific Division of the APA. Particular thanks for 
valuable comments on, and conversations about earlier drafts go to Anthony Cross, Arata 
Hamawaki,  Robert Hopkins, Alex King, Robbie Kubala, Eric Marcus, Mohan Matthen, Michael 
Milona, James Shelley, Servaas van der Berg, Daniel Whiting, Nicholas Wiltsher and two 
anonymous referees of this journal. 
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